Abstract
existence being readily identifiable to interested observers. Indeed, the absence of such analyses is particularly notable given that extensive research exists on the multiple trajectories and roles of Muslim Arabs across Central and South America (i.e. Klich and Lesser's edited collection [1998] ; Jozami 1996; Civantos 2006) , and, as Gómez notes vis-a-vis the invisibility of Muslim Africans (as opposed to Muslim Arabs) in accounts of migration to Cuba, "it is logical to assume that Muslims were arriving in Cuba in proportions similar to those in Mexico. That Cuba never developed a reputation as a Muslim haven requires some explanation…" (2005, 33) .
While I do not contest Menéndez-Paredes' assertion that Christian Maronites were, and continue to be, the most important religious group of the Arab diaspora in Cuba and across the American continent (1999; also Suleiman [1995, [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] [73] [74] [75] [76] [77] [78] [79] [80] [81] [82] [83] [84] [85] The article therefore firstly explores how Cuban socio-anthropological analyses of Arab migration have developed, whether there is a specifically "Cuban" school of "migration studies", and how migration, ethnicity and religion are related to the development of Cuba's official national identity. Secondly, it documents various "waves" of Arab migration to the island, arguing that these have been characterised by the accumulative concealment of Islam. Thirdly, it provides a preliminary comparative analysis of accounts of Muslim Arab, Chinese and Jewish migration to Cuba, asking why certain migrant communities, such as Chinese and Jewish migrants, have been the focus of academic and national/political attention while Muslim Arabs have effectively been rendered invisible.
Methodological Reflection
This article draws on insights developed and materials analysed during a three-month fieldwork visit to Cuba in 2006 . While I had originally arrived in Cuba intending to explore the experiences and expectations of Sahrawi refugee youth participating in Cuba's internationalist scholarship programme (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014) , I soon developed a parallel project comparing Sahrawi refugees' experiences with those of other Muslim Arab students studying in the island (FiddianQasmiyeh, 2010 (FiddianQasmiyeh, , 2015 . Examining the experiences of Sahrawi, Palestinian, Yemeni and Syrian students in Cuba as Muslims, and developing an analysis of the history of Cuba's scholarship programme for citizens and refugees from across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since the 1960s, led me to argue "that the presence of Muslim Arab youth in Cuba today can be understood as constituting a new form of migration -educational migration -that supersedes previous forms of connections between the Middle East and Cuba" (ibid, 139) . became increasingly aware of the invisibility of Islam in mainstream Cuban accounts of Arab migration to Cuba, leading to the current analysis, which counterbalances the hypervisibility of certain migrants in the official development and reinforcement of Cuban national identity, with the effective erasure of Muslim Arabs throughout different historical periods. The article's broadly deconstructive framework, and in particular the decision to centralize that which has previously been assigned a peripheral position, therefore developed following my departure from Cuba, as I re-analysed interview transcripts, archival materials and broader literature on the history and present of Arabs in Cuba.
Cuban analyses of immigration: Hybridisation, transculturation and repress-entation
Since the 1990s, Cuban academic and national institutions have traced the histories of different immigrant groups in Cuba. The Fundación has played a central role publishing analyses of "African," "Chinese," "Arab," "Japanese," "Hebrew," "Canary", "French" and "German" migration to Cuba, documenting how these and other migrant communities became integral components of "Cuban national identity." The Fundación's role as the key Cuban academic institution producing and disseminating anthropological "knowledge" about histories of immigration in/to Cuba cannot be underestimated, and builds directly upon the legacy of Fernando Ortiz (1881 Ortiz ( -1969 , the Spanish-Cuban anthropologist after whom the Fundación is named. Indeed, two of Ortiz's interrelated, if at times contradictory, legacies are of particular relevance to my analysis.
Firstly, one of Ortiz's most significant anti-colonial political contributions in the early-20 th Century was to centralise hybridity in conceptualisations of Cuban national identity, simultaneously rejecting the prevailing assumption that Cuban culture was born of Spanish colonial roots, and, for the first time, recognising the contribution of "Africans" to Cuba's identity for the first time. Ortiz's theory of "transculturation" became a key foundation of postRevolutionary official discourses of Cuban identity and belonging. Consciously developed "as a substitute for the term acculturation" (Ortiz, [1940] 1995, 97) which had been pro/imposed by Western sociologists and anthropologists, Ortiz argued in his 1940 study Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azucar that the neologism "transculturation" better expresses the different phases of the process of transition from one culture to another because this does not consist merely in acquiring another culture, which is what the English word acculturation really implies, but the process also necessarily involves the loss or uprooting of a previous culture, which could be defined as a deculturation. In addition it carries the idea of the consequent creation of a new cultural phenomena, which could be called neoculturation. (102) (103) More concretely, Ortiz asserted that "the real history of Cuba is the history of its intermeshed transculturations" (98), "an intense, complex, unbroken process of transculturation of human groups, all in a state of transition" (103). Centralising the multiple flows of diverse "human groups" to the island, he held that "there were no more important human factors for Cubanity [para la cubanidad] than these continuous, radical and contrasting geographical, economic and social transmigrations..." (1963, 102, author's translation) .
Through the metaphor of the ajiaco, an intense Cuban stew prepared with leftover ingredients, Ortiz identified diverse "human groups" as the ingredients which together form an ever-evolving multi-racial, hybrid Cubanity, arguing that Cubanidad is not solely to be found in the [stew] , but also in the complex process of its very formation, [which is both] disintegrative and integrative... being ajiaco, [the Cuban nation] is not a prepared stew, but is rather a constant process of cooking... It is for this reason that its composition changes and that Cubanidad should have different flavours and consistencies depending on whether one tastes [the stew] from the bottom, from the pot's belly, or from [its surface]. (Ortiz [1939 (Ortiz [ ]1993 Cuban national identity is thus conceptualised as inherently multi-racial and "constantly in- It appears simple to classify the human elements combined in Cuba by their races: copper Indians, white Europeans, black Africans, and yellow Asians. The four great vulgar races have embraced, mixed and re-mixed in our land over generations.
Indeed, despite resisting imperialist discourses and vocally denouncing classificatory systems "as absurd and artificial as the imaginary races invented by the race theorists of the present" ([1940] Macao, Canton, and other regions of the sometime Celestial Kingdom" (Ortiz 1995:9) . In the same text, he further identifies that "in the first waves of immigration came Genoese, Florentines, Jews, Levantines, and Berbers... -that is to say, representatives of the Mediterranean culture"
(100), and that "after the Negroes began the influx of Jews, French, Anglo-Saxons, Chinese, and peoples from the four quarters of the globe" (102).
On the other hand, despite highlighting the presence and incorporation of these diverse peoples into Cuba's ajiaco, Ortiz notes that his ongoing research in the 1940s will deal "with the effects ([1913]1986, 86, author's translation) . A further continuity with colonial conceptualisations of race emerges in Ortiz's hierarchy of most and least influencial races in the development of Cuban national identity: he clearly asserts the primary role of the white race (identified as the "basic" race), the secondary influence of the black race, and only a marginal influence of the "Asiatic races" (ie. ibid; also 1939, 19) .
Indeed, whilst "groundbreaking… Ortiz's work was not revolutionary" (Davies 2000,142) , and his political and academic legacy is equally paradoxical at times. Most importantly, Ortiz's conceptualisations of both the hybrid sense and consciousness of self referred to by Ortiz as Cubanidad y Cubanía ("Cubanness and Cubanity," 1964), and of the racial composition of mestizo Cuban national identity, were directly embraced by the 1959 Cuban Revolution which officially identified and celebrated the four main components of post-colonial Cuban identity as "Indian", "Spanish", "African" and "Chinese" (López 2009, 195 Essentially, the reinscription, legitimation and celebration of specific racial components and certain modes of cultural and racial hybridity, following Ortiz, have necessarily been accompanied by processes of racial and cultural, but also religious, marginalisation and exclusion. It is this system of centralising and heralding certain groups of migrants and particular identity markers whilst concealing others, in this case religious markers, which I refer to in this 'Chinese religion' in Cuba" (1998, 9) . Indeed, far from the Martian myth of racial democracy in post-Revolutionary Cuba and the official denomination of racial discrimination as "unpatriotic due to the founding nationalist mythology of racial harmony" (Roland 2006, 152) , an expanding literature on racial politics in contemporary Cuba identifies and critiques institutionalised and popular forms of discrimination and racism against diverse groups (ibid; de la Fuente 2001).
Hence, it has been widely noted that "The study of racial politics in Post-Soviet Cuba has been overwhelmingly framed within a black-white binary," and that "for the most part… studies on race relations and racial politics of Cubans of color in contemporary Cuba have neglected the existence of Chinese-Cubans and their role within Cuban race relations and politics" (Ju 2014 ).
Importantly, it is possible to trace a parallel with Ortiz's work in the relative displacement of Chinese-Cubans in contrast with the overarching contemporary focus on the "black-white binary": as noted above, Ortiz denominated the "Asian" influence on Cuban national identity as being of "tertiary" importance, regularly asserting that "the Cuban ethnic factor can be reduced solely to two extremes: white and blacks" (los factores... :16, author's translation), with his particular focus on "the Cuban integration of blacks and whites" continuing into the 1940s ([1942] 1993, 141-143) .
Nevertheless, despite evidence supporting such denunciations, the Chinese "component" of Cuban identity has been nationally celebrated since before the Revolution, and a significant amount of research has been conducted on Chinese-Cuban migration and identities by Cuban and non-Cuban analysts alike. In particular, studies have traced the importation of those referred to by
Ortiz as "semi-slave Chinese" (1995, 85) On the other hand, while it is now broadly recognised that particular "human groups" identified by Ortiz have been centralised in the Cuban nation-building project to the relative detriment of others, so too have these particular groups been either implicitly or explicitly associated by Ortiz and his followers with particular religious identities and practices. In effect, Ortiz's analyses of religion typically associate "white" migratory flows with introducing diverse forms of Christianity to Cuba (including in particular Catholicism, but also Presbyterian Protestantism, Methodist or Baptist beliefs, Ortiz 1939,15) while "black" African transmigrations are associated with fetishism, especially amongst the Lucumi. In turn, Ortiz's references to the religionmigration nexus also explicitly recognise the surrepticious arrival of "Jews and Judaists" (1939, (18) (19) through subtle means given that "the Jewish culture has always tended to be hidden amongst that of other groups, to avoid persecution" (ibid), "infiltrating" Cuba via Portuguese, Cuban intellectuals before and after the Revolution is paralleled and underpinned by the exclusion of Muslim Arabs from the Cuban nation-building project. The deconstructive framework espoused in this article therefore leads me to purposefully centralize that which has previously been assigned a peripheral position throughout the extensive "archive of knowledge" (Foucault 1989, 25) on Arabs in Cuba. This, in turn, leads us to ask whether there is a place for
Islam and Muslims in contemporary Cuban academia and political projects alike.
Equally, just as Chinese-Cuban focused analyses consider that the erasure of Chinese immigrants from historical accounts "promoted, somewhat ambiguously, by the Cuban state and its intelligentsia" must be viewed as part of an Orientalist framework (Scherer 1998, 1) , so too can the systems of repress-entation which have magnified the role played by Christian Arab migration, whilst footnoting the history and present of Muslim Arabs in the island. Consequently, we can therefore value Scherer's insight (9) 
Repress-enting Arab Immigration to Cuba
Despite adhering to Ortiz's political commitment to identify and celebrate the hybrid foundations of a united Cuban national identity through tracing the histories of immigrant groups'
"transculturation" in the island, contemporary analyses completed by the Fundación and its associates consistently reassert, rather than challenge, certain elements of unilinear acculturation models of migrants' incorporation into their host society, and the prioritisation of particular migrant groups' contributions to Cuba's society and nation. In addition, or perhaps as a precondition, to celebrating Arab immigration to Cuba through terms such as "assimilation" and "integration," these studies invariably declare that, unlike the Jewish or Chinese communities which reportedly demonstrated "traditional" isolatory tendencies (Charon 1992, 35) , the Arab "community assimilated itself immediately and came to have from the first moment, cordial relations and work contact with Cuban nationals" (González 1997, 9) ; Charon ultimately declares that Arab immigration to Cuba has been considered to be one of "the most assimilatable" of all immigrant groups which arrived in Cuba (1992, 56) .
It is perhaps this successful "assimilation" of Arab immigrants into the Cuban nation which has led to numerous authors excluding Arabs entirely from overviews of immigration to Cuba, thereby consolidating their invisibility. However, several accounts from the early-1900s use disparaging terms to refer to Arabs in general and Muslims more specifically, revealing their presence in Cuba through the authors' invocations of Orientalist tropes:
The Turks, as a group, are fanatics, like Muslims in general, and it is therefore not advisable to allow them to form large colonies… The Syrians, 6 whilst being Ottoman subjects, also [sic] have a greater tendency to Europeanise themselves, they don't practice polygamy and they adopt with great ease the customs of their country of immigration. In my view they are a thousand times more preferable than the Turkish mahometans. Dollero's statement (1919, 412) is made with reference to the 3,000 Muslims he estimated resided in Cuba at the end of the 1910s, leading us to trace both the ways in which such immigrants arrived in Cuba, and how these "antiquated Eurocentric discourses" (Scherer 1998) Indeed, Spain's unequivocal rejection of Islam and Muslims, in part due to fears of conversions to Islam in its "dominions" (Bristol 2007, 68) , led both to the development of Spanish Inquisitorial laws (including Spanish royal decrees issued throughout the 16 th Century) which explicitly prohibited the transportation of Muslims or "moors" to "the New World," and to the consequent development of mechanisms by which such laws could be by-passed by slave-traders, Cuban immigration officers and migrants alike. Indeed, Guanche argues that Jewish immigrants were present on all boats travelling to Cuba from Spain throughout the 17 th Century, and that they gained access to "the New World" by officially declaring their conversion to Christianity (1999, 18) . Guanche here draws on Ortiz, who (as noted above) dedicated a significant proportion of his discussion in Los factores humanos to addressing the arrival of Jews since Columbus' journey, and even proposed that "I might remark in passing that Bellester, Aguiló, and Velosa were probably of Jewish origin, as was, in the opinion of many, Christopher Columbus" (Ortiz Counterpoint, 265) .
Whilst Guanche ignores Muslim immigration to Cuba throughout this period, again following in
Ortiz's footsteps, a similar strategy of the "apparent negation of the Islamic creed" could also In contrast, in the context of the "American society where assimilation into a Eurocentric cultural orientation was practically mandatory," the strategy of choosing "the least offensive" national identity label at one point led to "Maronite Syrians" in the US, for instance, deciding to call themselves "Syrian-Lebanese," thereby eliding their religious identity through a more neutral national typology (Suleiman 1995, 80-81) .
c) Re-covering Islam?
Given the absence of literature focusing on the experiences of Muslim Arabs in Cuba, it is perhaps surprising to note that by 1916, of the 9,000 to 10,000 "Arabs" living in Cuba,
Menéndez-Paredes estimates in passing that a third to a quarter of these were Muslim (interview, Havana, 3 November 2006) . Although this is itself a significant proportion, it may reasonably be assumed to be an underestimate in light of the abovementioned factors prompting a concealment of religious identity.
Such population estimates are particularly pertinent when we compare the total absence of nonCuban analyses of Arab migration with the high degree of both Cuban and non-Cuban academic interest in Chinese migrants, who were calculated to number 10,300 according to the 1919
Census. By the time of the 1931 Census, 10 24,647 "Chinese" were registered as resident in the island, 11 while the colonia árabe (the "Arab colony"), including immigrants and their descendants, was calculated to surpass 35,000 (Charon 1992) . 12 By 1943 López indicates that "the total Chinese population dropped to 15,822, and by 1953 to 11,834" (2009, 181) , while the Arab community reportedly continued to increase. Given the numerical comparability between
Chinese and Arab migrants in the island before the Cuban Revolution, it is firstly notable, as (López 2009, 192) , and a "commemorative coin" marked with the Star of David celebrating "the work which the Jews contributed to the grandness of the city [of Havana]" (Calzada 1997, 4) . Notably, however, no similar governmental commemoration or recognition has been offered to Muslim Arabs. Furthermore, while the Cuban state has permitted the creation of multiple spaces for Jewish-Cubans to practise their religion and transmit a religious education to the younger generation (López-Levy 2003) , and has celebrated the Chinese "saint" Sanfancón (Scherer 1998) heralded by the Cuban state, however, neither the building selected in 1983, nor the street/area in which the museum is located, are historically related to "Arab" migration. Furthermore, although the Casa de los Árabes is the location of Cuba's only so-called "mosque," which was established by the state in the 1990s and may be considered to be an officially endorsed "Muslim religious space", it is, firstly, only a small "prayer-room" (muSalla) rather than a mosque (masjid), and is typically conceptualised by Muslim residents as "a tourist mosque" for Sunni diplomats and Muslim tourists visiting Cuba (also see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2010).
The second "Arab" space is the Union Árabe de Cuba, the institutional core of the "Arab" community in Havana, which is equally centrally and strategically located, but is also not historically an "Arab" building or part of an "Arab" neighbourhood. Indeed, the property was originally owned by the Union Sionista de Cuba (the Cuban Zionist Union), which was reportedly shut down by the Cuban state and handed over to the precursor of the Arab Union in 1978 (López-Levy 2003, 83) . Nonetheless, the UAC has increasingly conducted research about Arab migration to the island, and has itself invested in Monte, including by creating a "Memorial to Arab Immigrants" in the neighbourhood in 1998 (El Árabe 1998). Despite a minority of UAC reports recognising Muslims' historical presence in Cuba, and despite a small number of its staff referring to Islam in our interviews, as a whole the UAC continues to reproduce the official stance regarding Arab migration to Cuba, effectively equating Arabs with Maronite Christians.
Conclusion
Drawing this piece to a close, I argue that there is a particular urgency to make a space and a place for Islam within Cuban and non-Cuban accounts of migration, and post-revolutionary Cuban national identity alike, beginning with researchers retracing both the presence and absence of Muslims in Cuba's history and present. By centralising references which have until now been relegated to margins and footnotes, this article has presented an alternative history to that which prevails in official "archives of knowledge" pertaining to Arab migration to Cuba. Tracing the accumulative processes of repress-entation which have characterised the official celebration of "Arab migrants" as "the most assimilatable" of all immigrant groups, I have argued that this assertion's success is itself dependent upon the apriori erasure of Muslim Arabs from Cuba's hybrid "national identity."
As is often the case, the arrival of Arab immigrants to Cuba has been analysed according to Cuban national priorities. Hence, the ever-expanding number of Cuban analyses of Arab migration systematically reflects an official Cuban political commitment which derives in part from Cuba's post-colonial and revolutionary experience: these studies pay homage to the role played by different migrant communities in creating "Cuban national identity," asserting, rather than exploring, processes of successful assimilation and integration.
However, Cuban academic and institutional accounts of transculturation and post-revolutionary cultural and racial hybridity have simultaneously been characterised by what I refer to as systems of religious footnoting, through which particular groups of migrants have been rendered invisible.
Bearing the legacy of Cuba's colonial past, throughout different periods of history, Islamic identity and practice have been strategically concealed by members of immigrant and "host" populations alike through a variety of mechanisms, ranging from the hispanisation of migrants' names and the "recitation" of claims of religious persecution, to a distinctive process of accumulative erasure via a failure to identify or analyse the presence and experiences of Muslim Arabs in the island. In effect, Muslim immigration both before and after the Cuban Revolution has been overshadowed by a systematic focus on Christian Arabs, thereby leading to the category "Arab" being practically synonymous with "Christian," with wide-ranging implications for our understanding of Cuba's academic and political discourses regarding national identity and both racial and religious hierarchies in the twentieth and twenty first centuries alike. In essence, the continuity of Muslims' marginalisation by Cuban academics and officials today leads us to ask whether Cuba is now ready to revisit the legacy of colonial systems of repress-entation inherited from Spain, and to resist colonial and post-colonial oppositions to Islam.
